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LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE STABILIZATION- OF SECURITY PRICES '--The present Congres-
sional inquiry has brought before the public eye the problem of what, if any-
thing, is to be done to stabilize security prices so as to prevent a recurrence of the
catastrophe of the fall of 1929. It is estimated that between September 5 and
November 13 of that year the total value of all securities listed in the New York
Stock Exchange fell forty-two per cent., or an aggregate decrease in value of
twenty-six billions of dollars.' In the month of October alone fifteen billions of
values were wiped out. During this hectic period it was indeed a very usual
occurrence for some of the leading stocks to suffer losses of fifty or more points.
And on one day, October 31, two and one-third billions of dollars in lost values
were recovered?
Such tremendous fluctuations were to be found not only during the crisis of
October and November, or any other limited period; they are, rather, but exag-
gerated examples of the normal instability of security prices. Nor is this con-
dition peculiar to any particular stock or class of stocks. It has been estimated
that between September, 1929, and the same month in 1931 the aggregate value
of all listed stocks on the New York Stock Exchange has shrunk more than sixty
per cent., a depreciation of approximately $50,ooo000,000,.
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The tremendous injury suffered by American industry and commerce as a
result of the changes caused by this unprecedented condition has crystallized the
problem of stabilization of security prices and has made the consideration of reg-
ulation of some kind a duty of the legislators. In order to determine the efficacy
of legislative measures to prevent any future unbridled fluctuation in security
prices it is important to understand some of the factors which directly affect
security prices. Securities are, as traded upon the Stock Exchange, very similar
to any economic goods, in that their price is regulated by the laws of supply and
demand. Anything which tends to increase the supply of the commodity tends
also to decrease the price which one is able to obtain for a given unit of that
commodity. And similarly a decreased supply causes a rise in unit price. Com-
ing over to the demand side, the rule works conversely; namely, any increase in
demand will result in a higher price while a fall in demand causes a drop in price.
Since it is estimated that there are 17,000,000 investors scattered throughout the
country, each of whom holds securities listed on the Stock Exchange, any attempt
to stabilize security prices by controlling the supply of stocks and bonds must
necessarily fail for lack of concerted action. It is recognized by all interested in
security price stabilization that the measures used must strike at some regulation
of the demand for securities. A very important element in the establishment of
a strong demand for securities is an easy money-market. And, on the other hand,
'Stabilization, in reference to security prices, denotes not an absolute price fixing, but
merely the elimination of extreme fluctuations caused by artificial factors and resulting in
abnormal periods of booms and panics.
-FIsHER, THE STOCK MARKE CRASH OF 1929 AXD AFTER (1930). WARBURG, THE
FEDER.L RESERVE SYSTEM (1930) 502, n. I, estimates the decrease at twenty-three billions
or twenty-seven per cent.
'FISHER, op. cit. supra note I, at 7, II. The writer points out that during this period
General Electric dropped one hundred and twenty points, Westinghouse Electric dropped one
hundred aud ninety-four, American and Foreign Power one hundred and eleven and a half,
and American Telephone and Telegraph one hundred and thirty points.
I This estimate, computed on the New York Times average price of fifty stocks, is based
on the following averages: Sept. 19, 1929, peak of the boom period-3Ii.9o; Nov. 3, 1929,
lowest point of panic period-1i6.5; Sept. I9, 193i, lowest point reached since I924-1oI.3O.
LITERARY DIGEST, Oct. 3, 1931, at 44.
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there is nothing which can so effectively choke the demand for a security as a
scarcity of money. Therefore any regulation of the supply of money available
for purposes of speculation should result in a corresponding control over the
demand for a security.
Upon the introduction of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, it was gen-
erally thought that a stabilization of the banking system of the country would
directly result in a stabilization of the industries and markets of the nation
through the manipulation of the supply of money and its resulting effect upon
the commodity price level. That such a theory is not only feasible but also prac-
ticable is shown graphically by Mr. Fisher for the years 1924-1928 in which
commodity price levels were kept within very narrow fluctuations.5 By this very
power it was thought that the Federal Reserve Board would be able to control
any untoward fluctuations on the security and commodity exchanges of the United
States.
Since great hopes were placed upon the power of the Federal Reserve Board
to regulate and control the course of security prices, much criticism arose imme-
diately after the debacle of 1929. Some of this censure was directed against the
Federal Reserve System as inadequate:
"At the beginning of 1928, the Federal Reserve Board undertook a
a policy of deliberately tightening the market, and the theory that stock prices
can be controlled, not merely predicted, received its first real test. For
eighteen months, through publicity, through pressure on banks, and through
manipulation of discount rates, the power of the Federal Reserve Board was
directed to the aiin of making the financing of stock market operations so
difficult as to produce a stock market liquidation and thereby release money
for other purposes, but during this whole period the stock market advanced
at a rate never before witnessed.
"The experiment was a colossal failure." 6
But this criticism must, in all fairness to the system which it condemns, be di-
gested with a very large grain of salt. For, according to the opinion generally
exp-essed by leading economists, the fault was not in the system itself but rather
in the administration of the system by those to whom the ultimate control of the
many intricate workings and mechanisms of the system was intrusted. The Fed-
eral Reserve Board, it is claimed, was very cautious in its attempt to curb security
prices because its power to interfere with stock exchange activities was seriously
questioned.
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It is undoubtedly true that the Federal Reserve Board acted very slowly and
very cautiously in this, its first major test. The Board did not, at any time, take
a decisive step. Increases in the discount rate were made at a graduation of one-
half per cent. which had little or no effect upon the investing public, eager to
grasp the fabulous profits which were "just around the corner". This was
the time for an unequivocal assumption of control over the money market by the
Board and yet it showed its timidity and indecision in the statement:
'See chart in Fisher, op. cit. supra note 1, at 193, comparing fluctuations of price levels
during these years with previous periods.
'OWENS AND HARDY, INTEREST RATES AND STOCK SPECULATION (1930) 140.
See WARBURG, op. cit. Su pra note I, at 505. That this policy was forced upon the Board
by Congress is intimated in the following excerpt: "Attempts to divert credit into commercial
channel by legal decree assume a higher measure of elasticity than trade and commerce
actually possess. . . . There must be moreover somewhere in the credit field a residual
market for the investment of surplus funds. It is perhaps better that this residual market
should be related to security operations than to any other." AuxILIARy STATEMENTS Ac-
COMPANYING THE REPORT OF BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RESERVE
(i929) 140.
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"The Federal Reserve Board neither assumes the right nor has it any
disposition to set itself up as an arbiter of security speculation or values.
The Federal Reserve Board will attempt to regulate loans to brokers only
when such loans seriously prevent member banks from making required loans
to industries." 1
Indeed one writer goes even so far as to say that the Board was dominated, not
by caution, but "by political influences and considerations . . . [which]
ran directly counter to the principles dictated by banking experience and by the
teachings of economic theory." 9 If the merit of the Federal Reserve System as
a factor in the control of security prices is to be based on a test in which the scales
were weighed by prejudice and doubt, then we are forced to the conclusion that
it has failed.
But, disregarding for the moment the question of the past failure of the
Federal Reserve System, does it possess the potential power to exercise a stabil-
izing influence over the course of security prices? The Federal Reserve Act
contains several provisions which give the Federal Reserve Board and the several
Federal Reserve Banks great possibilities of exercising control over the money
market and security loans.
The first factor is the provision in the Act that the Federal Reserve Banks
shall not discount for any member bank any paper which represents invest-
ments or which is ". . . issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying or
trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment securities except bonds and notes
of the Government of the United States." 10 By this provision, Congress sought,
not to prohibit banks from lending to those engaged in speculation but merely
to show its disapproval of such loans by preventing the lending bank froin
obtaining ready funds from Federal Reserve Banks upon the strength of such
loans. The recently passed Glass-Steagall Bill "I amending the Federal Reserve
Act exhibits an even stronger antagonism to such loans. By its provisions a
member bank is forbidden to make any such loans while its reserve requirements
have been temporarily suspended during a period of credit stringency. However
this new measure becomes effective only in periods of abnormality; it is not a
weapon to be wielded in the normal and usual course of events. As for the orig-
inal provision against the rediscounting of obligations arising out of speculative
transactions, this, too, it must be admitted, is one of little or no value for it is
entirely possible for a bank to rediscount its entire supply of eligible (what we
might call legitimate business as contrasted to speculative) paper and then reinvest
all credit received as the proceeds of such rediscounting in speculative trans-
actions. So the effect of this restriction is merely to limit the amount of loans
for security obligations to the total amount of cash and credit which the indi-
vidual bank itself can command.
The second factor in the control of security prices is through control of the
rediscount rate. The Federal Reserve Act gave each Federal Reserve Bank the
power to establish from time to time rates of discount to be charged by it,' -
I Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1929, at 93. One writer goes so far as to say
that if the Board had raised the rate in the spring of 1929 when requested to do so by certain
bankers, "a study in the rise in security prices thereafter established the fact that the drop in
securities would have been twenty billions instead of forty billions". Hurd, Protecting Busi-
ness and the Public Against Recurrence of Speculative Excesses (193o) 51 TRUST CO.It-
PANIES 437.
'Morganstern, Developments in the Federal Reserve System (193o) g HARV. Bus. REv.
I, 9.
"38 STAT. -63 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. (1927) §343.
Sen. Rep. No. 3615, 72d Cong., ist Sess., approved by President Hoover on Feb. 27,
1932.L 38 STAT. 264 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. (I927) § 357.
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subject, however, to review and determination by the Federal Reserve Board in
the exercise of its supervisory power.1
Since a Federal Reserve Bank is a banker's bank. a place where banks come
to borrow money, it charges a discount to member banks just as does the member
bank when it lends its credit to a customer. By regulation of this rediscount
rate, the Federal Reserve Banks have a means of encouraging industry and com-
merce in times of depression by offering to the member banks vast loans at a very
small interest charge. Since the member banks are thus able to get a large supply
of credit at a low rate, policy will demand that, instead of charging the usual
interest rates and receiving but few applications for credit, the interest rate be
dropped so that a volume of loans can be placed. As a consequence of the
reduced cost of carrying a loan, manufacturers and merchants will be able to
rehabilitate themselves much more quickly since reduced interest charges will
place more money in circulation and increase the demand for their products. And
when a period of healthy prosperity is displaced by a boom period of over-
enthusiastic investment, the Federal Reserve Banks raise the rediscount rate to
such a high level that the member banks in order to make their investments profit-
able must curtail their commitments so as to reduce their rediscounting to a
minimum. As a result industry and commerce find money extremely scarce
and prices thereupon fall in order to adjust themselves to the new relation of
supply and demand. Consequently, trade is slowed up and a return to normalcy
follows.
There remains the power of the Board to buy and sell United States Govern-
ment securities. 4 Since these securities are highly desirable investments, when
offered for sale they are purchased in large quantities and thus operate to with-
draw a large supply of money from circulation since the Federal Reserve Board
"hoards" the money received from the sale of these securities.
Formerly, it was generally conceded that the price of a security should
approximate a figure ten times the amount of its net annual earnings. But the
dawn of a new era was announced in which stock prices were no longer to be
governed by this antiquated rule of thumb. Reasons galore were given for the
discarding of this scale of values-new methods of manufacturing, distribution,
finance and banking all contributed to justify valuations fifteen and twenty and
even twenty-five times as great as net earnings. 15 Thus the public was led to
ignore these time-hcnored danger signals and speculation continued rampant.
The public demanded money and was willing to pay any price for it. During
the period in review, loans to brokers increased by six and a half billions of
dollars or to a point four and a half times their original figure.' One writer goes
so far as to estimate that on March 2o, 1929, one-third of all the stocks listed on
the New York Stock Exchange were held on margin."7 Money-lending became
a very lucrative proposition-so lucrative indeed that industrial corporations saw
fit to invest their surplus capital in this manner. Moreover, new business enter-
prises, known as investment trusts, formed for the purpose of attracting funds
for investment in securities, threw their funds into the call money market. An
analysis of the total amount of brokers' loans made on October 2, when such loans
were at a very high figure, shows that of the total loans made only 12.4 per cent.
'38 STAT. 262 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. (1927) §248 (b).
"38 STAT. 274 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. (1927) §355.
' See DicE, NEw Lnv-ELs IN THE STOCK MARKET (I929).
' Snyder, Broker's Loans and the Pyramiding of Credit (i93o) 25 J. Am. STATis. Ass'x
88.
"Clay, What Caused the Panic? (1930) 25 FORBES MAc. 19. He reaches this conclu-
sion in the following manner-on that date the total amount of outstanding security loans
was Io,576,ooo,ooo; assuming a margin on one-third of the market value, there were ap-
proximately $35,ooo,ooo,ooo stocks carried on margin while the total value of all stocks
listed on the Exchange was only iio,oooooo,ooo.
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were made by New York City banks, 21.2 per cent. being made by out-of-town
banks and the part contributed by non-banking individuals or corporations was
66.4 per cent.18
These so-called "bootleg loans" (since they are made by persons not in
business to lend money) were not subject to the direct control of the Federal
Reserve Board and therefore the rediscount rate had no effect on the persons
extending them, except that an increased rediscount rate would have seriously
curtailed such loans by the indirect method of preventing the lenders from bor-
rowing money from banks for operating purposes while they loaned their surplus
funds on hand to brokers. The objection to bootleg loans is that such lending is
unscientific and, since it is done by financial novices, very risky. This was thor-
oughly shown by the course of events of November, 1929. At the first sign of a
collapse, these loans were immediately called and money became very scarce as
margin buyers scurried around to find money to protect their holdings. When
the floating supply of money was exhausted, stocks were thrown on the market to
permit the repayment of these huge loans. It is argued that if these loans had
been made by the highly efficient bankers of New York City they would have
been gradually liquidated so as to have obviated this collapse. In tribute to the
Federal Reserve System, it must be said that its great elasticity permitted New
York bankers to expand their loans by one and a quarter billions of dollars in
order to cushion the effect of this sudden and ill-timed withdrawal which caused
the liquidation of more than one-half of the outstanding brokers' loans, over four
and a half billions, within a period of six weeks.' 9
Much of the blame for the crash of 1929 must be laid at the door of these
bootleg lenders and it seems that any comprehensive plan for security price
stabilization must include some regulation and control over all funds to which
brokers have access. One writer suggests legislation placing the regulation of all
Stock Exchange borrowing under the control of the Federal Reserve Board.'0
Under such a plan only banks members of the Federal Reserve System would be
permitted to make such loans. By whom shall this legislation be enacted? The
Federal Government, of course, has control over the Federal Reserve System but
it cannot by legislative fiat say that all loans to brokers can be made only through
banks which are members of this system. This would, in effect, forbid state
banks to make such loans and only the sovereign authority which grants the
charter to such banks can regulate their business. The legislatures of the various
states might, by statute, regulate such loans by forbidding all banks holding char-
ters granted by them from making any loans to brokers.2 1 This regulation might
also be extended to cover loans by non-banking individuals, but the adequate
'Ibid. The more conservative estimate of the New York Federal Reserve Bank taken
as of the same date places the figures respectively at I5.7%, 26.9% and 57.4%. Taken from
report of Hearings before a subcommittee of Committee on Banking and Commerce, U. S.
Senate, 71st Cong., ist Sess. (i93i) on Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Bank-
ing Systems VII, p. Io2o. During the period that brokers' loans increased four and a half times,
security loans made by New York banks increased only by two-thirds. ". . . in the twelve
or fifteen months preceding the panic . . . with very little increase in the total of collateral
loans by the banks . . . total Stock Exchange borrowings increased by nearly four bil-
lions." Snyder, op. cit. supra note 16.
"Snyder, op. cit. supra note 16.
-Clay, op. cit. supra note 17.
1 Since such regulation is in the public interest it might well come within the police power
of the state. The police power is ". . . the power of the state to make all manner of rea-
sonable laws for the welfare of the commonwealth and the good people thereof." BIFRLY,
POLICE POWER STATE A.D FEDERAL (1907) 9. "Chartered rights and privileges [as here held
by banks] are therefore, like other property, held in subordination to the authority of the
government, which may be so exercised as to preclude the use or doing of the very thing
which the company was constituted or authorized to manufacture or perform." 2 HARE,
A.iErc.tA CoSTsrrUTIONAL L,,w (888) 767.
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enforcement of the law against these persons would be extremely difficult. If
the statute took the form of declaring all such loans void and non-enforceable
certainly lenders would be very unlikely to risk such loans since the broker after
taking the money could not be compelled to repay the loan.22  An alternative plan
which might give even more adequate control over brokers' loans would involve
the transferring of this power to make such loans from the member banks to the
Federal Reserve Banks.
2 3
In order to facilitate the enforcement of this plan and to secure the cooper-
ation of brokers in this plan why should not the Stock Exchange pass a regulation
forbidding its members from using funds borrowed from sources other than the
Federal Reserve member banks? The absolute power which the Governing Com-
mittee wields over the members of the Exchange would guarantee compliance.2'
Of course such a form of regulation must be adopted voluntarily and would be
subject to enforcement only by the Stock Exchange without the possibility of




Such a plan of regulation does not effectually control all loans made for
speculative purposes since it would still be possible for the speculator to borrow
his money at his bank rather than to carry the stock on margin and financed by
his broker. But in such case the money would be infinitely more difficult to obtain
since under the present system the brokers' personal credit is a very important
factor in lending for speculative purposes. Another fact which would tend to
remove the practical objection to this plan is that the borrower, if he were unable
to obtain an extension of credit from his broker, would be compelled to borrow
money from the bank. Then the borrower is in the predicament of attempting
to secure a collateral loan without being able to deposit the securities until he has
paid the purchase price therefor and a technical difficulty would be thereby super-
.imposed.
Another major cause of the panic of 1929 can be found in the insufficient
margin requirements resulting in a complete wiping out of the marginal buyers'
equity and inadequate security to the broker which, in turn, caused him to dispose
' This type of compulsion has met with success in restricting usurious rates of interest on
small loans.
' That the Federal Reserve Board would be fully within its authority in thus enlarging
the powers of the Federal Reserve banks, so as to make them "bankers and brokers" banks
rather than merely "bankers banks" seems clear. The practical advantages of this plan are:
(i) to separate brokers' loans from all other commercial loans thus making available at all
times the statistics on the quantity of such loans outstanding., (2) to reduce the sources of
brokers' loans to one coordinated lending agency-the twelve Federal Reserve banks-which
would prevent any over-extension of credit to favored brokers through secret agreements
with friendly banks, (3) to restrict loans for speculative purposes by using for this purpose
only residual and surplus funds which are not otherwise necessary for industrial and com-
mercial transactions. There are two very great practical difficulties to such a plan: (I) This
plan would deprive both the state banks and the national banks of a very great source of in-
come; in fact, it would deprive the banks in New York City of one of their principal sources
of income. Therefore any such proposal will be met with a great opposition from these
powerful interests. However, if some equitable plan of distribution of the profits from such
loans is devised-the banks would not be compelled to absolutely give up this revenue. (2)
The second objection is the old cry that the government must not enter into business. Despite
the persistent outbursts of the adherents to this policy, it seems that the very creation of the
Federal Reserve System approaches the conduct of the banking business through govern-
mental agencies.
'Article XXII of the Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange provides that all
contracts for the "borrowing, loaning, or payment of money, whether occurring upon the
floor of the Exchange or elsewhere, are contracts subject to the rules of the Exchange."
'A step in the direction of voluntary limitation on these bootleg loans was taken by the
New York Clearing House Association when, on November i6, i93I, a constitutional amend-
ment became effective which barred all member banks from lending on Stock Exchange col-
lateral for the account of "others." (1931) 20 CoMMER~cE AND FINANCE 1646.
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of the stock immediately. While prices were soaring skyward, brokers were only
too prone, in the enthusiasm of the day, to require minimum marginal require-
ments since it was, they thought, impossible for the price of stocks to depreciate
to any great degree, beyond the ordinary daily fluctuations. Therefore the first
drop of a few points, in itself no significance, caused the brokers holding these
securities to make demand for additional margin. Although the additional margin
required was comparatively small, investors found the replacing of the lost points
very difficult due to the huge pyramiding of holdings originally acquired on a
"shoestring".2 8 Upon the failure to make good these margins the brokers imme-
diately threw these blocks of stock on the weakening market. In response to the
increased supply of stocks, prices fell still lower. With each fall in price, more
stocks were closed out and more violent drops resulted. What was originally but
a slight weakening-a fall of two or three points--culminated in a complete
destruction of the market.
2
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It has been suggested that, in order to prevent any recurrence of such a
precipitation of values, a uniform credit and loaning policy be adopted by banks
throughout the country under which no collateral loan shall be extended to any
individual in excess of seventy-five per cent. of the value of the security offered
as collateral. The value of the security is to be determined by appraisal and in no
instance to exceed twenty times its net earnings as shown by last report. This
plan would "... prevent unwarranted speculation on credit through the me-
dium of broker's marginal accounts, for the reason that it would limit the ability
of brokerage firms and investment houses to borrow funds for financing their
customers on any but a sound investment basis." 2s
That any plan which has as its purpose the creation of a uniform margin rate
sufficiently high to prevent the complete wiping out of margins by a sudden and.
momentary change of the market is desirable can hardly be disputed. That the
value which serves as the basis for ascertainment of the loan should be, not the
swollen, abnormal price of the bull market, but rather a "safe and sane" price
based upon some reliable index to the intrinsic value (not price) of a corporate
security is also. uncertain. Whether or not the actual earning of the corporation
is the most desirable basis for fixing normal values is not within the scope of this
note. Yet it is evident that such a method of valuation would seriously hamper
any attempt at pyramiding since the amount of the loan would be uninfluenced by
even a very strong increase in the market price of the stock and the broker would
be unable to finance the buying of additional stock on the paper profits accumu-
lated by the marginal purchases.
Since this plan aims particularly for the strengthening of the banking system,
its enforcement by voluntary action upon the part of the banking industry should
be expected. The propounder of this scheme would have such a regulation
effected by resolution of the American Bankers Association. Should such a pro-
-' Pyramiding is the use of paper profits gained in marginal transactions as a margin for
further commitments.
-Fisher, op. cit. supra note i, at 43, 46, seems to be of the opinion that the marginal re-
quirements were sufficiently high and that this "selling out" was not involuntary.
' Cahill, Plan to Elininate Ezils and Prevent Recurrence of Mania for Stock Specula-
tion (1930) 5o TRUST COMPANIES 23. To illustrate the difference between the two systems:
Assume that the bank will lend only 75% of the market price, and that the stock is selling at
1oo while the net earnings for the period are 5%. A very strong market pushes the price up
to 2o0, an increase of oo% under the existing practice of reserves on security loans results
and the bank would increase its loans to the broker from 75 to i5o still reserving a 25%,
margin of safety. Under the proposed system, since this increase in price has occurred very
quickly and no change in the earnings of the corporation is announced the value of the secur-
ity remains ioo and the maximum amount of the loan 75.
It is interesting to note that in the report of the Hughes Committee in i9o9, infra note
33, a somewhat similar plan was suggested which would have set the value for computing
margins required of customers by brokers at a price higher than the current price.
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cedure be inadequate to enforce this provision, resort should be had to concerted
action by Congress and the state legislatures making such a restriction upon loans
to brokers mandatory.29
Turning from considerations of the money market to the problem of legisla-
tion directly affecting the purchase and sale of securities, resort to state regulation
of prices has been suggested as a remedy for these abnormal fluctuations. It has
been proposed that fluctuations in stocks should be limited by the setting of maxi-
mum and minimum prices for a given stock. Annual earning power of the cor-
poration would be the basis upon which such prices would be fixed. The range
of permitted fluctuations would vary according to the nature of the business
represented by the stock. Mining stocks representing an extremely speculative
business would be accorded greater limits than railroad stocks whose earnings are
very strictly regulated by government interdiction.
The state has the power to fix prices for an industry or business where such
industry or business is "affected with a public interest" ;20 and such power should
be exercised whenever ". . . the system of prices determined by individual
bargaining exposes even a limited social group to the dangers of oppression and
extortion, and this is even truer where that system produces consequences inju-
rious to the social group as a whole .... ." .1 In order to justify state control
over prices, it need not be shown that those in control are unlawfully fixing prices.
State price regulation may be justified by reason of the inadequacy of the competi-
tive system to adjust prices satisfactorily. 32
It is unnecessary to discuss the constitutionality of such an arbitrary estab-
lishment of prices, since the undesirability of such a measure dispenses with the
need for such consideration. The setting of price limits for dealings in all stocks
on the Exchange would not necessarily preclude the sale of stocks at a price not
within the prescribed range if the buyer and seller are equally anxious to go
through with the transaction. The parties could make a private over-the-counter
'deal and thus evade the restrictions placed upon the Stock Exchange transactions.
The net result, therefore, of setting prices would be to drive security transactions
from the floor of the Stock Exchange where they are subject to a certain degree
of control and supervision to the street where all control is lost. Even the tem-
porary setting of prices to avoid an upheaval of the security market would have
the same effect. Price regulation of securities is entirely undesirable because the
many divergent factors which are present in the investor's mind when he evaluates
a given security make any arbitrary valuation of little influence in changing the
mind of the investor. If he were unable to get the desired security on the
Exchange because of the price limitation he would look for it elsewhere. If a
minimum price were set during a period of uncertainty, is not unlikely that the
public would take such a minimum price as an expression of the Exchange's
opinion as to the actual worth of the security and persons holding that stock
would immediately offer it for sale at any price above the minimum. Since the
buyers would also be influenced by this fact, they will not pay any price above
' A statute requiring banks to adopt special restrictions in making loans on corporate
stock would not be any more arbitrary than a provision restricting a bank's loans to any one
individual to an amount not exceeding io% of the capital and unimpaired surplus of the
bank. Such a provision is found not only for Federal Reserve member banks, 38 STAT. 264,
12 U. S. C. A. (1927) § 345, but also under the banking laws of the following states: Ariz.
Laws 1922, c. 31 § 19 (25%) ; CAI- CODES AND Gr-iz. LAws (Supp. 1927) 1799 (graduated
scale); KAN. REv. STAT. Axx. (923) § 9-117 (I5) ; I. CoM'. STAT. (1922) § 8013
(20%) VTr. GEN. LAws (091) § 5363 VII (graduated scale).
M unn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 13 (1876) ; German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233
U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914).
1Rottshaeffer, The Field of Governmental Price Control (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 438,
450. : Simpson, Due Process and Coal Price Regulation (1924) 9 IowA L. B. 143, 135.
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the minimum and the stock will immediately drop to that point. And so the
system of price-fixing would merely accentuate the fluctuations of securities and
tend to restrain a normal rise in security values.
The target of most of the darts and thrusts of the antagonists of an unre-
stricted-by-legislation security market is shortselling as practiced on the New
York Stock Exchange. A short-seller is one who, believing the price of a certain
security, or of securities in general, to be too high, sells stock which he does not,
at the time, own. The short sale is a legal and enforceable contract. 33 Moreover
it has at times received commendation as a necessary and fundamental element of
our modern system of commerce and industry.3 New York, in 1858, repealed a
law forbidding short sales by a statute specifically providing that any sale shall
not be "void or voidable, because the vendor, at the time of making such contract.
is not the owner or possessor of the certificate or certificates or other evidence of
debt, share or interest." -5
The principal objection voiced against shortselling is that it tends to arti-
ficially cause prices to fall. Since the shortseller's object is to make profits from
a resulting fall in prices, he is pictured as a demon who contrives and plots to
take the hard-earned dollars of the honest investor by undermining the values of
securities. At this point it is necessary to differentiate between legitimate short-
selling and "bear-raiding" which is an organized plot to cause a sudden collapse
of the market by selling short a great block of securities at a low price with the
purpose of misleading investors into believing that the market is very weak and
causing them to liquidate their holdings rapidly. "Bear-raiding" has always 6een
condemned by the New York Stock Exchange and its practice forbidden to the
members of the Exchange. Recently an investigation was conducted by the
Exchange for the purpose of discovering whether this practice was the responsible
factor in falling security prices. The result of this investigation was a finding
of a total absence of these "bear-raids". 36 Therefore this discussion will be
limited to legitimate shortselling. Shortselling, like speculation. is not an activity
necessarily unproductive.:7
Shortselling on commodity markets is economically justifiable since it permits
a manufacturer to safeguard his profits by "hedging" when he is making sales
for future delivery of manufactured goods for which he has not yet procured the
raw material. If shortselling were abolished he would be required when making
contracts to sell for future delivery, to charge a price sufficiently high to protect
his margin of profit from any adverse fluctuations in the cost of his raw materials
(it is assumed that all other costs of production are fixed). But through the
medium of a short sale, the manufacturer can definitely fix his costs for raw
material, and the customer is benefited by a resulting diminution of this added
charge by insuring against the rise in price of the raw material.
' The legal distinction between a short sale and a gaming contract to settle differences
arising from the fluctuation in the price of the stock lies in the intention of the parties to
make an actual delivery of the stock sold in the short sale. See Irwin v. Williar, io U. S.
499, 5o8, 4 Sup. Ct. i6o, 165. The test of legality is whether the buyer has the right to de-
mand delivery. DEWEY, LEGISLATIox AGAINST SPECULATION (1905) 8. See (1931) 80 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 299.
" Report of the Hughes Committee (N. Y. i9o9) reprinted in VAN ANTWE'RP, THE
STOcK EXCHANGE FROM WITHIN (914).
N. Y. Laws 1897, 511.
Address by President of the New York Stock Exchange on "Short Selling", Oct. 16,
1931. A similar investigation is now being conducted by a Senate investigating committee.
' "Organized Speculation not only transfers the burden of risk from one pair of shoulders
[farmer, manufacturer or producer] to another [professional speculator] better fitted to take
it, but it cuts down the risk of over or under production for the community of any one com-
modity." Parker, Goz'emwental Regulation of Speculation (i911) ANN. A-I. AcAD. Soc. &
POL. SCL 126.
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However. on the Stock Exchange there is no such need for speculative
"hedging" transactions since the subject of sale is not a raw material which is
required by industry. On the Stock Exchange shortselling should perform the
very important function of keeping security prices within the limits justified by
sound business policy and a study of the earning power of the corporation whose
capital stock the securities represent.3 8
The crash of 1929 illustrated how the enthusiasm of a vast investing public
can allow its emotional drive to overbalance its judgment of values. Corporate
stocks after all, in themselves, are worth nothing; they are valuable because of
certain incidents which attach to their ownership, such as the right to participate
in the assets, management, control and profits of the corporation. Since corpo-
rations are not formed for the purpose of immediate liquidation of their assets,
and since the vast amount of outstanding shares in each corporation preclude any
but the most opulent investors from participating in control and management of
the corporation, the primary purpose for which a stock is valued is its ability to
yield profits in the form of dividends. Therefore it must follow that the market
price of the stock should bear some relation to its earning power. It should be
the economic function of shortselling to maintain a uniform relation between
lower and market price of securities.3" In 1929, because of the failure of short-
selling to perform this duty, stocks rose to fabulous prices, absolutely uncon-
trolled by any regard for earning power and when shortselling attempted to
readjust prices, the rise had been so great that the normal function of gradual
equalization was made impossible because of the liquidation resulting from the
sudden drop in prices caused by the resumption of shortselling activities.
40
In addition shortsellers perform another function, that of providing a de-
mand for securities when prices have reached their lowest point after a decline
and thus enabling the market to speedily recover from a weak position. Every
short sale requires a subsequent purchase and immediately after a sharp fall the
time is opportune for the shortseller to clip his profits. It seems that the short-
seller by selling when prices are too high and by buying when prices are too low
does perform an economic function of great importance. Therefore any legis-
lation which would absolutely prohibit 41 shortselling is inadvisable since it would
pre rent the exercise of a very potent weapon against over-inflation of security
values.
M Professor Huebner in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, U. S.
Daily, Feb. IS, 1932, at 2855, lists the six services resulting from shortselling as: (I) Main-
tenance of a continuous market, permitting a purchaser to find another who is willing to sell
at all times; (2) Maintenance of odd lot business permitting purchase and sale of securities
in lots of less than ioo shares; (3) Selling of securities by persons not in New York by the
sale of borrowed securities; (4) Permits distributors of new stock issues to dispose of stocks
in an unfavorable market; (5) Permits the practice of arbitraging in differences in prices be-
tween two Stock Exchanges; (6) Permits the absorption of stock "rights".
' The result of shortselling as here explained is to wipe out the differential between two
existing evaluations-the existing security market quotation based on speculatory opinion and
the business value of the stock based on a study of the intrinsic worth of the corporation rep-
resented by the security. In this process the shortseller may be likened to an arbitrager who
takes advantage of a price differential between two markets dealing in the same commodity.
By resisting any rise in market price the shortseller tends to restrain an increase in price, but
if the business value is sufficient to justify such an increase, the price will rise in spite of the
shortseller's efforts to restrain it by reason of the increased demand at the former price caus-
ing the price to rise and. the shortseller will be compelled to accept a loss when he repur-
chases.
,o "If we had had more shortselling during the summer [of x929] it would have of course,
restrained the undue rise in share prices at that time, and would have provided bids in the
market during October and November." FisHEa, op. cit. supra note I, at 54.
'Such a bill was introduced by Mr. Sabath of Illinois and is now before the House
Judiciary Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 4639, 72d Cong., ist Sess. "A prohibition of short
selling, in brief, would be equivalent to tampering with the thermometer in a frigid house as
a substitute for putting on the heat." Editorial in THE NATION, Dec. 30, 1931, at 713.
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Admitting the economic necessity for shortselling, it does not follow that
it should be allowed to go on without government control, regulation or super-
vision.
"An appreciation of the economic utility of shortselling does not require
the belief that shortselling in all circumstances by everyone is a complete
boon. It is one thing for isolated professional bears and occasional amateurs
to express by short sales their judgment of the level of certain stocks, and
quite another for a great investment trust or a powerful group of individuals
to add an enormous volume of selling to a market in panic." 4 2
How far should governmental regulation extend? At the present time there are
three bills before the House Judiciary Committee which would restrict or control
shortselling: (i) To prohibit the use of interstate commerce for conveyance of
information concerning "wash sales" which are contracts to settle differences and
hence gaming contracts; 4 3 (2) To prohibit the use of interstate commerce for
transmission of false information concerning security prices; 4 (3) A bill similar
to the first mentioned with the additional prohibition of the maintenance of
"bucket shops" in territories under federal jurisdiction. 45  All of these bills are
very desirable, each striking at a fundamental evil of unlawful speculation but all
of these regulations are now enforced under both the statutes of New York
4 6
(and of several other states) and the rules of the New York Stock Exchange.
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Federal enforcement of such laws, however, is greatly to be desired as a necessary
supplement to state enforcement.
The most important piece of proposed legislation 4s now before the House
Judiciary Committee would not restrict short sales nor impair 'their validity in
any way but would require certain publicity to be given to all such transactions.
It applies only to short sales of securities issued by corporations engaged in
banking or commerce. By its provisions, a complete record is required to be kept
by all stock exchanges of every short sale including the name of the stock, the
number of shares, the names of the buyer and the seller and their brokers, and
any other information which may be desired by the Federal Trade Commission
in whose hands the enforcement of this act is to be entrusted. Such records are
to be kept daily and regularly compiled by each stock exchange and subject to
examination by the Federal Trade Commission. A daily summary of recorded
short sales is to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city
in which the stock exchange is located. The enforcement of the proposed act is,
in the main, to be coercive rather than punitive: (i) banks, members of the
Federal Reserve System, are not permitted to lend money to any stock exchange
(or member thereof) which fails to comply with the provisions of the act; (2) no
such bank and no corporation engaged in interstate commerce is permitted to
allow its securities to be listed on a stock exchange which does not comply with
the provisions of the act; (3) such stock exchange is not permitted to use the
mails for the transmission of any information concerning short sales coming
"Hanna. The Fcderal Regulation of Stock Exchanges (93) 5 So. CALIF. R.v. 9, 17.
' H. R. Rep. No. 4604, 72d Cong., ist Sess., introduced by Mr. Kelly of Pennsylvania.
H. R. Rep. No. 4638, 72d Cong., rst Sess., introduced by Mr. Sabath of Illinois.
H. R. Rep. No. 348, 72d Cong., rst Sess., introduced by Mr. La Guardia of New York.
11 N. Y. Cons. LAWS (Cahill, i93o) c. 41 § 95i (wash sales) ; § 952 (false information);
§ 390 (bucket shops).
" The Governing Committee has complete power to suspend member for any "conduct or
proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade." Constitution of New
York Stock Exchange, Art. XVII § 6. In addition wash sales are specifically prohibited by
resolution of Feb. 5, 1913, and bucket shops by a resolution oi May 19, 1909, while the resolu-
tion of May 9, 19oo , gives the Exchange complete power over members' use of telephone or
telegraph connections.
,1 H. R. Rep. No. 4, 72d Cong., rst Sess., introduced by Mr. La Guardia of New York.
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under the provisions of the act. In addition to these very powerful teeth, there
is a punitive provision subjecting any one who violates the provisions of the act
to fine and imprisonment.
The constitutionality of the bill has been seriously questioned.4 9 Section 3
deals in a prefatory manner with the need for such legislation and attempts to
set out the basis for federal regulation of short sales: Stock exchange quotations
of the purchase and sale of securities issued by corporations engaged in banking
or commerce (which are acknowledged to be subject to the control of Congress
or designated federal agencies, the Federal Reserve System. the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission) intimately concern
interstate commerce and banking by reason of their effect on the financial
status and credit of such corporations. Also ". . . the arbitrary and normal
decline in prices produced by short sales induces needless liquidation in these
securities, creates dissatisfaction with the corporations which issue such securities,
destroys the credit extended on the faith of such securities, undermines confidence
in the banks which have extended such credit, causes hoarding and seriously
impairs and directly affects the banking and commerce of the country." Since
shortselling has such an important effect upon commerce and banking over which
functions the power of federal control is established by the Federal Reserve Act
and the "commerce clause" of the Constitution, Congress should have the right
to control a practice which has such a deleterious effect upon these functions.
The argument against the bill is that there is no relation between corporate
securities and the interstate commerce in which such corporations engage. If this
is so, then Congress should not be permitted to regulate the sale of such securities
since.
"Assuming that Congress may have the power to determine on what
conditions commerce may be conducted under corporate organizations or by
corporations, it does not follow that it would have an unlimited power in
prescribing the terms and conditions of corporate organization to be exacted
as a condition of such licenses." ro
But. Congress in its regulation of industry through the commerce clause is not
limited to the control of the subject matter while it is actually in the movement in
interstate commerce but its power extends also to any intermediate step occurring
while such goods are in the stream of interstate commerce. In Chicago Board of
Trade v. Olsen ' the Supreme Court in upholding the Grain Futures Act 1"- said
that sales of grain futures which occurred in Chicago were a part of interstate
commerce even though at the time of the sale the buyer, the seller and the grain
were all within the state of Illinois and reiterted its previous statement that
"AWhatever amounts to more or less constant practice and threatens to
obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within
the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause." 1
It must be observed that regulation of stock exchanges involves an entirely
different problem than does the regulation of commodity and produce exchanges.
In the latter the subject of sales on the exchange are actual goods which are
usually sent through interstate commerce to huge warehouses in the city in which
"Mr. Whitney, president of the New York Stock Exchange, declared that "this proposed
bill seeks to sweep away all constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to regulate
purely local and intrastate affairs." New York Times, Feb. 25, 1932, at i.
r7JUDSON, INTERSTATE COMMERCE (3d ed. 1916) 135.
51262 U. S. I, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (923).
=42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. (1926) c. i.
' Stafford v. Wallace, 238 U. S. 495, 521, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 403 (1922).
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the exchange is located while securities are, in the majority of cases, never removed
from the city in which the sale takes place. If the security is removed, such
removal is not an incident of, nor in any way connected with, the sale. The for-
mulator of this proposed legislation cannot by glibness of word supply this missing
essential-constitutional authority for federal control of the sale of securities of
corporations whose business is subject to federal regulation.
However, there is a strong argument in favor of the bill which has its basis
in the power of the federal government over the incorporation of business asso-
ciations engaged in interstate commerce. Although federal authority to incor-
porate public utilities and national banks is well established by decision, 4 the right
to incorporate purely mercantile or industrial organizations has never been judi-
cially determined. This power is generally believed to exist." If this is so then
it is within federal power to govern the issuance of the corporate shares. Having
the power over the issuance of securities, would not federal power continue over
the securities in so far as future sales thereof are concerned?
Aside from the question of constitutionality the bill has the admirable feature
of compelling the stock exchanges of the country to make public certain of their
records which should be laid open. If "bear-raiding" exists today (that such a
condition exists is denied by the officials of the New York Stock Exchange) then
a disclosure of such activities will do much towards discouraging such practices in
the future.50 Many things which are done "in the dark" would never be done if
the spotlight of publicity were focussed upon the participants. It is therefore
sincerely to be hoped that some method of bringing the proposed act within the
narrow bounds of the federal powers granted by the Constitution be found.
Legislation for the purpose of stabilizing security prices should seek to
accomplish the following desired results: (i) A vesting of greater power in the
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve System; (2) The elimination of
the "bootleg loan" by unscientific lenders; (3) A uniform system of bank credit
on security loans based not on inflated prices but rather on the earning power and
intrinsic worth of the corporation issuing the stock; (4) Adoption of effective
means to stamp out "bear-raiding" or illegal shortselling by giving full publicity
to the complete records of short sales occurring on all stock exchanges.
D.H.R.
=' This right was recognized as early as 18ig in the famous case of -McCulloch v. Ifary-
land, 17 U. S. 316.
Excerpt from Report of Garfield, commissioner of corporations under President Roose-
velt, reprinted in Wilgus, Federal License or Federal Incorporation (I9O5) 3 \Icr. L. REv.
264, 26.5: "It may be considered as established that Congress may: (i) create corporations
as a means of regulating interstate commerce . . .; (4) as a condition precedent to the
grant of such corporate powers lay any restriction it chooses upon the organization, conduct
or management of such corporations . . . and may use any and all means 'which are ap-
propriate, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion.'"
"In the organization and creation of our system of national banks, the way was paved
for an extension of this system to other corporations..... Neither the Constitution of the
United States nor federal or state statutes so distinguish between banks and other corpora-
tions that the analogy cannot be reasoned out. The constitutional warrant for the national
bank would seem to include a similar warrant for the industrial combination." Dill, Aational
Incorporation Laws for Trusts (rpo9-) II YALE L. J. 273. 295.
1 A similar attempt to publicize the records of short sales was made in Germany under
the Bourse Law of 1896. It failed because there was no governmental agency to enforce the
provision for the recording of all short sales in the Exchange Register and consequently
short selling was carried on with flagrant disregard for this requirement. See Emery, Refqu-
lation of the Stock E.rchangc in Germany (19o8) 17 YALE REvimv 5. The present bill
remedies this defect by supplying a capable governmental agency to supervise such records.
In addition the New York Stock Exchange has sufficient control over its members to guaran-
tee the fulfillment of this provision, if it desires.
